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Abstract
The objective of this article is to explore the value of psychoanalysis in the early 
twenty-first century through reference to Freud, Lacan, and Stiegler’s work on com-
putational madness. In the first section of the article I consider the original objec-
tives of psychoanalysis through reference to what I call Freud’s ‘normalisation pro-
ject’, before exploring the critique of this discourse concerned with the defence of 
oedipal law through a discussion of the post-modern ‘individualisation project’ set 
out by Deleuze and Guattari and others. Tracking the development of ‘the individu-
alisation project’ in history, I consider its connections with the cybernetic theories 
of Wiener and Shannon in the psycho-cyber-utopianism of the 1990s, before moving 
on to consider the other side of the psychoanalytic-cybernetic interaction through a 
discussion of Jacques Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
in the second section of the article. In reading Lacan’s seminar on Freudian drive 
in terms of the cybernetic repression of death, I set up the conclusion to the article 
which involves a discussion of Bernard Stiegler’s ‘survival project’ that relies on a 
recognition of the limit of death in order to produce human significance and oppose 
the madness of our contemporary computational reality.
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1  The Freudian System and Beyond
What is the purpose of psychoanalysis in the early twenty-first century? In the late 
19th and early twentieth century Freud’s invention was focused on strengthening 
the ego in the name of supporting the social self and finding ways to manage the 
pathological symptoms emerging from its primitive other, which Freud thought was 
poorly suited to living under the repressive structures of ‘normal’ society. The ques-
tion of Freudian psychoanalysis was, therefore, concerned with how to (a) ensure the 
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subjection of the self to the laws of civilization and (b) manage the fall out of social-
isation through the treatment of the consequent symptoms of psychological distress. 
Thus, we might conclude that Freudian psychoanalysis was from the very start a 
‘normalisation project’ focused upon ensuring human survival and working through 
the impacts caused by the transformation of the pre-human primitive into the social 
human. But by the mid to late twentieth century Freud’s critics, including Marcuse 
[1], Foucault [2], and Deleuze and Guattari [3], had started to argue that Freudian 
civilization was about more than survival and instead represented the psycho-poli-
tics of the old, phallic patriarchal order that needed to be swept aside to enable the 
youngsters to take over. In this respect the legitimacy of Freudian law was thrown 
into doubt and challenged by a new regulative principle: the law of the desire of the 
self. In this way the new counter-cultural law became about self-realisation and indi-
vidual becoming in the face of a highly conservative system that was now thought to 
be illegitimate. The law of the Oedipal father had now been supplanted by the law 
of his children in the process of becoming. By the middle of the twentieth century, 
the struggle between these two regulative principles became central to the politics 
of psychoanalysis. This was the conflict between the ancient law of the authoritarian 
father who founded society and the new law of his rebellious children who wanted 
to escape from his repressive system in order to become their own people. Freud’s 
‘normalisation project’ was now under serious threat from the rebels’ ‘individualisa-
tion project’, where the only law was the law to become who you are.
Although Christopher Lasch’s [4] criticism of the culture of narcissism showed 
that the novel turn towards self-realisation was not without its problems, by the end 
of the 1960s it was clear that Freudian conservatism was out of step with the emerg-
ing politics of the individual set upon the realisation of desire. In the face of the dark 
pessimism of the Freudian model, where the basic objective of the social system 
was to support the survival of the self that would surely self-destruct left to its own 
devices, the new psycho-politics of individualism started out looking like a recipe 
for utopia in respect of their refusal of limits and opposition to processes of normali-
sation. In this situation the role of society was minimal because the individual was 
now sovereign and restriction was considered illegitimate. Nobody wanted to listen 
to Dad in the new world because the law was about becoming, rather than limitation 
for the sake of others. However, the new utopia of becoming was short-lived because 
its expression through the market subjected individual freedom to the economic law 
of industrial production, consumption, production ad nauseam and trapped the freed 
self inside the endlessly repetitive capitalist system that seemed to have no outside. 
This is, of course, exactly what Adorno and Horkheimer [5] explained in their cri-
tique of the problem of industrially produced pseudo-individualism in the mid-twen-
tieth century. Beyond Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique, however, the ‘individu-
alisation project’ found new life in the 1990s in the cyber-utopianism that emerged 
alongside the democratisation of the internet. In this period virtual space was under-
stood as a kind of lawless electronic frontier where cybernauts could explore their 
identity beyond the limits of the material body. In much the same way that Deleuze 
and Guattari’s [3] schizophrenic broke free of the law of the father by taking flight 
through the rhizomatic connections of desire, the cybernaut found the possibility of 
freedom inside the virtual network where the centre is everywhere and the boundary 
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nowhere. In this new world the body started to look like something we could live 
without. Indeed, it was possible to maintain this utopian idea of the internet until the 
dot com crash in 2000, which led Silicon Valley start-ups to begin to look for new 
ways to capitalise on the newly networked self. At this point the complete freedom 
of the virtual cybernetic self started to fold back towards the paradox of the techno-
pseudo-individual who feels completely free, but is in actual fact a servo-mechanism 
in a vast system of surveillance, behaviour modification, and profiteering through 
the translation of human experience into valuable data [6]. Enter the new law of 
computational identity, and the situation of the freed self within a new behavioural 
utopia where algorithmic certainty is more important than human freedom, which 
I want to return to later in this piece through discussion of Stiegler’s [7] high-tech 
nightmare.
Before we think about Stiegler, however, let us consider the same high-tech night-
mare in Shoshana Zuboff’s [6] work. Beyond Adorno and Horkheimer’s [5] critique 
of consumer capitalism, and on the other side of the cyber-utopianism of the early 
1990s where the individual was completely free to be who they wanted to be in the 
new virtual universe, Zuboff explains the new law of computation and the commodi-
fication of data in her book on surveillance capitalism. In Zuboff’s critique of the 
totally networked system, the problem of computational identity revolves around the 
idea that the self is endlessly in the process of being uploaded to a high tech, global 
network where it is transformed into data that is valuable for modelling behaviour 
and creating certainty for advertisers who want to know that their marketing hits the 
consumer right between the eyes. In this respect the effect of the network is to simul-
taneously (a) open up channels of communication between the self and the online 
world and (b) enclose the possibility of the now cybernetic self inside a circuit of 
surveillance, behaviour modification, and profit organised to ensure the production 
of late capitalist certainty. Thus the idea of individual freedom that evolved from 
the post-Freudian champions of the self up to the cyber-utopians is now subjected 
to a new law of computational certainty. The self is now a calculation. Under these 
conditions every move we make is predictable. This is, in my view, the challenge 
psychoanalysis must address in the early twenty-first century. Beyond Freud’s ‘nor-
malisation project’, on the other side of the rebels’ ‘individualisation project’ that 
eventually found novel form in the cyber-utopianism of the 1990s, I want to suggest 
that the problem of psychoanalysis in the early twenty-first century is to develop a 
‘survival project’ to save the self from destruction in computational systems that 
have the potential to calculate it, and every other form of organic life, out of exist-
ence. In order to explain what this ‘survival project’ might look like I turn to Stie-
gler’s [7] apocalyptic thinking.
While the problem of Freudian psychoanalysis was the social control of primitive 
man and the symptoms resulting from his repression in civilization, and the objec-
tive of Freud’s post-structural critics became about escape from the miserable fate 
of Oedipus, my argument is that the central question for psychoanalysis in the early 
twenty-first century revolves around responding to the ‘normal pathological’ situa-
tion brought about by the uploading of the individual to a network that is no longer 
able to sustain meaningful life (and potentially life in itself) because it is entirely 
characterised by technological processes of surveillance, datafication, behaviour 
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modification, and instrumentalisation [6]. Under these conditions the problem that 
confronts psychoanalysis is less the need for repression to control the primitive self 
(‘the normalisation project’) or escape from psychological control in the name of 
the imagination (‘the individualisation project’), but rather the paradox of hyper-
individualism where the self collapses under an excess/lack of freedom which we 
might understand in terms of the replacement of meaningful social structures by 
technological systems that no longer speak to the human need for significance to 
make sense of the narratives that connect past, present, and possible liveable futures. 
Here, the problem of the hyper-, or, we might say more-than-individual concerns the 
fatal tension between (a) absolute freedom from constraint brought about by the uni-
versalisation of the ideology of consumption and the consequent collapse of social 
structure that had been set up around the law of the need for the limitation of the self 
and (b) complete determinism resulting from the emergence of technological and 
algorithmic forms of organisation that advance consumption by wiring the individ-
ual into circuits of surveillance and behaviour modification. Thus the individual is 
absolutely free to consume and pursue its deepest darkest, most perverse desires, but 
at the same time condemned to a life of meaninglessness by the withdrawal of social 
symbolic systems towards a high level of technological abstraction that no longer 
carries human significance. In this situation the individual is completely free, but at 
the same time wired into a cybernetic system where its behaviour is translated into 
code that renders its movements entirely predictable into an endless machinic future 
where nothing ever changes.
Cast out of the meaningful symbolic systems that have historically, to use Winni-
cott’s [8] language, ‘held’ the individual and made them human, the self has no way 
to orientate itself in time or understand the connections between past, present, and 
potential futures that structure the possibility of free will. The result of this retreat 
of meaning is that the individual’s experience of their own development through 
time starts to atrophy into a kind of permanent present defined by the higher level 
of technological abstraction, algorithmic logic, and instrumentarian circuits that sit 
behind the virtual networks which appear to enable absolute freedom, but in actual 
fact reduce the now cybernetic self to a less/more than human servo-mechanism 
determined by surveillance, datafication, and behavioural control [6]. This is the 
computational law of the contemporary global economy. Caught in the computa-
tional bind between (a) the appearance of absolute freedom and (b) the unconscious 
sense of complete determinism without (c) the mediation of a social symbolic sys-
tem to locate the self in temporal structures, the individual collapses towards the 
addictogenic logic of drive which offers no escape from its terminal situation, but 
simply confirms its subjection to the fatal mechanisation of the networked system 
that has no objective beyond its own (endless) reproduction. In the face of this situ-
ation the objective of a new psychoanalytic ‘survival project’ would be to save the 
cybernetic self from its fatal mechanisation through opposition to the addictogenic 
system where the behavioural reflex of unthinking consumerism stands in for free-
dom of thought, free will, and motivated social action based upon the reconstruc-
tion of significance within symbolic systems that operate on a human scale. In the 
discussion that follows I seek to outline this project through reference to the work 
of Stiegler and in particular his recent discussion of disruption and madness [7], 
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but before I reach this point I want to start by exploring the complicity of psychoa-
nalysis, technology, and cybernetics. The reason this reconstruction is important is 
because recognition of the history of what Lydia Liu [9] calls ‘the Freudian robot’ 
will shed light on the challenge Stiegler explores in his work and that I consider key 
to understanding the political role of psychoanalysis in the early twenty-first century.
Although Liu centres her study upon the relationship between Wiener, Shannon, 
and Lacan, she might have projected her discussion back further to consider the 
origins of the Freudian machine. In Liu’s work it appears that the Freudian robot 
was Lacan’s invention, but there is a sense in which Freud’s psychoanalytic self was 
always already becoming a technological organism comprising a primitive throw-
back (the Id), a forward facing social self (the ego), and a sociological other (the 
super-ego) able to ensure that the primitive in man never takes over, but instead 
somehow manages to follow the (Oedipal) law. In this vision of human psychology 
the self looks like a kind of communication and control system leading to the pos-
sibility that the history of psychoanalysis might be understood in terms of the explo-
ration of the ways in which primitive man is subjected to sociological law through 
(a) historical communication systems (psycho-sexual development and socialisation 
through the family) that enable (b) social control (the incest taboo and its extension 
into the law of father) to operate more or less successfully. Of course, there would 
have been no need for psychoanalysis in the first place if this machine worked per-
fectly, and the history of analysis has always revolved around working on malfunc-
tions in cases where the technological self fails and communication and control no 
longer function. In these cases Freud is a psychic engineer working out problems of 
communication (the failure of Oedipus) and control (lack of integration/normalisa-
tion) and looking for ways to repair the defective psychological mechanisms in the 
name of the functionality of the cybernetic psycho-social machine. Now it has not 
escaped the notice of key historians of psychoanalysis, including Friedrich Kittler 
[10] and Eric Santner [11], that in many of the most famous cases of psychoanalysis 
the metaphor of the psychic machine is fully revealed and requires very little inter-
pretation. Let us reflect on the most famous of these cases for a moment.
First, consider Freud’s [12] Schreber were the paranoid judge struggles with 
‘writing down machines’ controlled by his torturing God and the entire universe 
operates like a vast technological system set upon his torment. The metaphor of 
the machine is similarly revealed in Victor Tausk’s [13] study of the diabolical 
‘influencing machine’ that looks like a coffin and ends up representing the auto-
mation and eventual death of Tausk’s patient, Natalija A. Developing Freud and 
Tausk later on in the twentieth century, Bruno Bettelheim’s [14] famous case 
study of ‘Joey, the mechanical boy’ makes it clear that the idea of the machine 
takes over when human life itself becomes unbearable. In the case of Joey a lack 
of parental love leads the youngster to find comfort in cardboard boxes and tin-
foil devices that represent his mechanical escape from feeling and pain. In each 
of these cases the machine emerges revealing problems in the communication 
and control systems of the self that would otherwise ensure the normal running 
of Freud’s technological human. In much the same way that Heidegger’s [15] 
machine only reveals itself in its dysfunction—so, for example, I only become 
aware of my computer keyboard when the ‘F’ key sticks and I am estranged from 
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the device in the act of typing that no longer simply happens—the malfunction 
of the Freudian machine reveals its mechanisation in the form of what Jeffrey 
Sconce [16] calls ‘the technical delusion’, where madness takes the form of a 
fantasy about controlling machines (including in contemporary society television 
and the internet). Although Sconce recognises the paradox of the technical delu-
sion today, which is, of course, that one no longer necessarily needs to be para-
noid to imagine that one’s movements are being closely watched by some remote 
power, he does not take the next step that would involve understanding the delu-
sion of mechanisation as a recognition of the basic technological nature of the 
self made through its connection to society.
The value of making this point in the context of writing the history of the tech-
nical delusion would be to say that what the history of mechanical madness really 
reveals is the ongoing history of the collapse of the Freudian technological self in 
the face of the organic that endlessly resists technology and that what the problem 
of reality testing and the undecideability of sanity/insanity in the hyperconnected 
world illustrates is the possibility that the madness of Schreber, Natalija A., and 
Joey might no longer be pathological, but rather the normal psychological reality of 
life in a situation scarred by technological estrangement. In other words, in the new 
hyperconnected world we are all like Schreber and our pathology is a perfectly nor-
mal response to the madness of our high-tech social system that seeks to reduce the 
organic to the level of the machine. There is, I think, a sense in which Freud [12] was 
alive to the possibility that this is what might happen in the future (that is that the 
machines might take over) in his discussion of the problem of reality testing and the 
question of whether Schreber was onto something in his memoirs. Indeed, this might 
lead the reader of Freud to consider Schreber a key moment in early psychoanalytic 
thinking where the problem of the failure of the cybernetic human–machine inter-
face shifts from one focused on the importance of the integration of the primitive 
self (where the problem of Thanatos is on the side of the unconscious) to one con-
cerned with the extremism of the control machine itself (where death comes from 
the abusive interventions of the sadistic father and is only later internalised into the 
funereal self), which would involve the leap from Freud’s early ‘normalisation pro-
ject’ to his own critics later ‘individualisation project’ that he (Freud) could never 
fully recognise or take on board. This is, of course, precisely how Eric Santner [11] 
reads the Schreber case in his My Own Private Germany. In Santner’s exploration 
of Schreber’s secret history of modernity, little Daniel fails to pass through Oedipus 
and become normal because of Dad’s sadistic therapeutic gymnastics, causing him 
to take off into paranoid delusion in order to save some semblance of a self. In other 
words, little Schreber imagines a completely mechanised universe set upon his sur-
veillance and behaviour modification on the basis of his Dad’s extreme communica-
tion and control system organised to produce robotic men who could cope with the 
new modernity (industrialisation, urbanisation, technological communication). This 
had, we must not forget, led the original sociologists Marx, Weber, and Durkheim to 
imagine society shot through with estrangement, disenchantment, and anomie and 
there is secret history of the cybernetic metaphor in sociology (taking in Parsons 
and others) to be written. But that is for a separate article. For now we must stick to 
Freud and Santner’s Schreber.
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In Santner’s [11] sociological analysis of the Schreber case the problem of child-
rearing, trauma, and paranoia was not confined to little Daniel Paul, but rather ruined 
a whole generation of German kids leaving them feeling crushed, hardened to pain, 
and marked by a complete lack of empathy for others. In the context of Germany’s 
late nineteenth century hyper-masculine culture that found human weakness intoler-
able, Santner shows how these kids grew up into incomplete men who easily made 
the switch from masochism and the desire for domination to sadism and the drive to 
destroy the pathetic self in the other who started to look like a monstrous inhuman 
creature. In this way it is possible to see that the problem of the cybernetic proto-
Nazi we find in the writings of Klaus Theweleit [17, 18] and Andreas Huyssen [19] 
was less an issue of the Freudian id in need of civilization and more about the social 
communication and control system itself slipping into over-drive. Although we can 
read about drive in Freud’s [20] work, there is no concept of ‘over-drive’ in psycho-
analysis, which one would have to imagine represents what we reach when we move 
beyond drive. What is beyond drive? According to Freud [20] writing in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle this is, of course, death itself which would explain everything 
about the link between the works of metalised writers such as Ernst Junger [21] and 
Ernst Von Salomon [22] and the eventual emergence of the suicidal Nazi state that 
was always rushing towards its own dead end. In other words, what Junger, Von 
Salomon and the Nazis wanted was to become machines, because this was prefer-
able to the weakness of the human that they wanted to eliminate. But even though 
Freud’s post-war critics [1, 2, 3] recognised the need to move on from the father’s 
‘normalisation project’, and understood that this was in many respects implicated in 
the paranoia of the state that saw enemy others everywhere, the problem is that their 
own ‘individualisation project’ never really escaped the gravitational field of the 
cybernetic self that grew up on Allies’ side of the war. We can see this most clearly 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s [3] critical transformation of the idea of mechanisation 
into machinism and their attempt to move beyond the paranoia of the state through 
the madness of the schizophrenic. Here, the Anti-Oedipal project embraces the cir-
cuitry of the cybernetic self by leaning on Bateson’s [23] machinic thinking, making 
use of the metaphor of the rhizome that extends in every direction, and pushing the 
idea of the desiring machine which centrally, Deleuze and Guattari point out, never 
escapes the pull of the paranoid state.
Given Deleuze and Guattari’s [3] conclusion that the schizophrenic can never 
break with the paranoid system once and for all, but only ever manage to reveal its 
difference from normal function, it is clear that where they separate from Freud is 
in finding virtue in malfunction, rather than in stepping outside of his cybernetic 
vision of psychology completely. In other words, Anti-Oedipus never challenges the 
basic idea of the technological self, but simply emphasises the possibilities of the 
‘individualisation project’ inherent within the inevitable malfunctions of the Freud-
ian machine, which is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari’s work was taken up so 
enthusiastically by the Californian cyber-utopians in the 1990s who (a) evoked the 
spirit of the counter-culture to move beyond the cybernetics of the Cold Warriors 
(b) and made the connection between the schizo and new techno-frontiersman work-
ing on his/her computer [24]. At no point, however, in this history of the shift from 
Freud’s ‘normalisation project’ to the rebels’ ‘individualisation project’ was the 
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problem of the extension of the cybernetic idea (the mechanisation of the human) 
ever really in question, which is the point I want to suggest we reach in Stiegler’s [7] 
critique of techno-scientific excess and the complete robotisation of the self. Thus, 
I think Stiegler seeks to move beyond (a) Deleuze and Guattari’s schizophrenic and 
(b) the cyber-utopian idea of the experimental cybernaut because he recognises that 
these two versions of the ‘individualisation project’ represent the disruptive cutting 
edge of Freud’s functionalist self that has been (fatally) updated under the sign of 
Wiener and Shannon’s Cold War vision of communication and control in the con-
temporary surveillance capitalist system, which we might think about in terms of an 
extreme or hyper- ‘normalisation project’. Why ‘hyper’ or ‘more than normal’? The 
answer to this question relates to the extremism of the technology connect between 
human and machine. That is to say that what we find in Zuboff’s [6] critique of sur-
veillance capitalism is a system that no longer normalises through Freudian cultural 
values, rules, and regulations that humans can understand, but rather an abstract 
machine that engineers absolute normality through the transformation of experience 
into data, algorithmic power, and behaviour modification.
In this respect, the new cybernetic system produces ‘more than’ normality, but 
Stiegler’s [7] point, which Zuboff never makes, is that the very extremism of this 
system means that what it ends up normalising is pathology itself, since it is impos-
sible for the human to tolerate being transformed into a servo-mechanism without 
descending into pre-/post-human madness, precisely because the essence of human-
ity resides in the ability to exercise free will on the basis of an understanding of 
environmental conditions (the present) and the likely outcomes of motivated action 
(what happened in the past and how action might play out through the present in 
order to produce a future). Thus the new regime of ‘hyper-normalisation’ creates 
a situation that is also ‘less than’, ‘lacking’ or pathological in respect to normality, 
which is why Stiegler [7] connects this system to a kind of everyday madness and 
suggests that what is necessary to respond to this situation is less individualism (we 
are all pseudo-individuals today, caught somewhere between more/less than nor-
mality) and more a ‘survival project’, which could reconstruct the human from its 
organic basis founded upon its existence on earth that it then translates into a mean-
ingful world. But how would this work? What would this ‘survival project’ look like 
and how could we (humans) save this utopian possibility from the current nihilistic 
system that seems endless? Before we reach Stiegler [7] and flesh out his theory 
of the high-tech apocalypse, it is important that we understand how psychoanalysis 
became fully robotised through consideration of Lacan’s [25] seminar on Freud’s 
theory of the compulsion to repeat and the fatalism of the letter that always reaches 
its destination.
2  Lacan’s Cybernetic Turn
I think that it is possible to find the classic statement of the Freudian ‘normalisation 
project’ in Civilization and its Discontents [26] because this is where Freud most 
clearly explains the necessity of the social control of primitive man. In this essay 
Freud’s basic thesis is that humanity is too destructive to be left to its own devices 
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and that some kind of society is essential to keep humans alive. In this respect, soci-
ety is a kind of cybernetic life support machine set up to prevent humanity short-
circuiting straight to self-destruct. However, the issue with this set up is that social 
security causes its own problems and Freud notes that rules, regulations, and pro-
hibitions lead to enormous frustration. The basic emotion of civilized humanity is 
misery. We always want more, something else, and constantly seek it out. By vir-
tue of our invention and ingenuity, Freud says that we have transformed ourselves 
into ‘Prosthetic Gods’, but this has made no difference to our levels of satisfac-
tion. Humanity remains unhappy with its lot. But what is it that we really desire? 
In Civilization and its Discontents [26] Freud refers to the ‘oceanic feeling’ which 
describes the experience of the dissolution of the self and a profound sense of unity 
with existence that he understands in terms of death. Essentially, we want to escape 
ourselves (our separation) for some kind of peace. At this point, Freud clearly leans 
on his own speculations from a decade before when, in Beyond the Pleasure Prin-
ciple [20], he first raised the problem of humanity’s suicidal nature. In this essay 
Freud takes off from the observation of a child’s game, ‘fort/da’, which he suggests 
reveals the way humanity seeks to master the traumatic experience of lack through 
symbolism. ‘Fort/Da’ is a symbolic representation of the trauma of mother leaving /
returning. What the kid can’t control in reality, he masters through play, thus solv-
ing the problem of trauma on a symbolic level. Unfortunately, Freud notes that since 
symbolism never really hits the spot, because it is impossible to resolve a traumatic 
situation that has already happened, the symbolic fix must be repeated endlessly in 
order to constantly defer traumatic recall. In Freud’s view, this is the compulsion 
to repeat, which resides on the other side of the pleasure principle. That is to say 
that if humans desire pleasure because pleasure makes them feel satisfied, then the 
compulsion to repeat looms into view because the search for pleasure is endlessly 
thwarted by the essential relationship between the human and trauma. We are our 
trauma and we cannot take this away. The role of Freudian psychoanalysis is to lead 
humans towards acceptance of this psychological fact.
Expanding upon this interpretation, Freud’s next move is to say that the compul-
sion to repeat is not simply a psychological condition concerned with the attempt 
to repress trauma, but that it is also reflective of an existential state he calls the 
inertia of being. What is the inertia of being? It turns out that the inertia of being 
describes the cyclical nature of existence itself, where organisms are born, live, and 
die in order that others might take their place, which Freud thinks is hard-wired into 
human psychology. The self is, after all, part of existence. Now the problem with the 
civilized human who reflects upon their lot, wonders about the meaning of existence, 
and searches for solutions to the experience of lack is that, in Freud’s view, they will 
soon become possessed by Thanatos or what he calls the death drive, unless some 
form of regulation is in place to prevent this happening. What this means is that 
when we take the risk to look behind the endless line of symbols we use to defer 
the experience of trauma what we find is that what we really want is to escape the 
self, which is born in traumatic separation. Behind the various symbols we use to 
hide from ourselves, we discover our constitutive trauma. This is what we want to 
escape. In other words, we enter drive when we look beyond the symbolic façade 
and confront the reality of what it would take to resolve our traumatic core. This is 
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why Freud [20] writes about the condition of possession by Thanatos in terms of 
the Nirvana complex and evokes the Buddhist notion of the annihilation of the self 
to explain its function, with the important difference that he wants to contain the 
drive towards death in the name of saving the ego. Unlike the Buddhist who pre-
fers the end of the self to the suffering of desire (the Buddhist concept of samsara), 
Freud thinks that misery is preferable to Thanatos and an orgy of destruction. Thus, 
humanity must be subject to cybernetic support and limitation in order to survive. 
Humanity cannot survive on its own. It needs its machines.
Now it is precisely this point about the fundamental machinism of humanity that 
Lacan [25] picks up on in his 1954–155 seminar on Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
and the emergence of the ego. According to Lacan, Freud’s greatest achievement 
was to reveal the decentred nature of humanity and show that we are never really 
ourselves. As Lacan says, the ‘I’ is always another. Reading Freud’s essay, Lacan 
starts by explaining that the desire for pleasure represents humanity’s orientation 
towards ‘the good’. While the search for pleasure represents progress (we’re end-
lessly moving forward), Lacan points out that the compulsion to repeat is regressive. 
In his view the compulsion to repeat is endless behaviour, in the sense that it is reac-
tive and unthinking. We’re under the influence of something else here, something 
other than conscious thought, because the compulsion to repeat has no objective 
beyond its own reproduction. The compulsion to repeat is nothing but pure mecha-
nisation. Recalling Heidegger’s [27] theory of the difference between humans, ani-
mals, and rocks, Lacan explains that if the animal is a machine unable to think its 
way out of its environment, the human is only slightly better off. This is because we 
are similarly ‘jammed’ by instinct, though we can at least escape our animal selves 
into the ego, which is the first object. This is essentially why we are excentric (exter-
nal or outside) to ourselves. Unlike animals that are self-identical, Lacan points out 
that the human is separate from itself and only comes together in its mirror image. 
Thus recognition of the mirror image is the fundamental machine because it creates 
a feedback loop between the registers of the imaginary (the image of the body) and 
the real (the flesh of the organism) to enable the emergence of the self. For Lacan, 
this basic machine represents Freud’s [20] constancy principle (pleasure), since it 
provides some sense of a stable self (this is who I am!), which is then endlessly 
challenged by the repetitive search for the object lost in the trauma of separation. 
Since this lost object is itself lost to processes of repression which mean that we 
cannot remember what we really want, Lacan evokes the idea of the symbol and the 
symbolic order, which is his second machine. What this means is that the symbol 
stands in for the lost object. However, we know that the connection between the lost 
object and symbol could never be the result of a conscious decision, simply because 
the lost object is lost to repression, meaning that the process of symbolic construc-
tion must take place somewhere else, which is why Lacan’s second machine is the 
unconscious.
However, Lacan’s symbolic system is not simply unconscious in the sense that it 
is hidden somewhere in the subject’s mind. It is, instead, external to the self com-
pletely. In other words, it is no longer somewhere inside the head of the subject, but 
rather located in the communication and control system of language that sits outside 
of the self, leading Lacan to the techno-scientific conclusion that psychoanalysis is 
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not a humanistic form of knowledge. This is, in Lacan’s view, why Freud moves 
into biology, rather than further into philosophy to explain the workings of the self. 
Beyond Hegel [28], who was never able to move beyond the anthropological ‘just so 
story’ of the master/slave dialectic, Lacan explains that Freud introduced the prin-
ciple of energy into understandings of human psychology. Essentially, Freud turned 
the human into a machine in search of homeostatic equilibrium. Why is homeosta-
sis impossible to achieve? The reason that we never reach equilibrium is because 
the dream machine continues to provide symbolic information about what we need 
to reach a state of systemic balance fuelling the mechanical compulsion to repeat. 
This is, essentially, Lacan’s [25] cybernetic re-reading of Freud, which he cements 
by explaining his idea of the symbolic law through reference to the Bell Telephone 
Company’s translation of communication into code. Noting that Bell needed to 
economise, and reduce the amount of information they had to pass through their 
phone lines, Lacan explains that the company sought to simplify communication. 
The impact of this move was to transform complex communication into simple code 
that was no longer transparent on its own terms. At this point he says that language 
became material, thing-like, objective and in need of interpretation/decoding to 
make sense. The point here is, of course, that psychoanalysis relies on a similar cod-
ing/decoding operation in the sense that the symbolic representations of the uncon-
scious require reading by the analyst in order to expose their connection back to 
the lost object where meaning resides. The wider significance of the link between 
the psychoanalytic technique and cybernetic understandings of communication is, 
however, that beyond this or that representation of the lost object, the basic code of 
the symbolic order functions on the basis of whether or not the subject (a) possesses 
the object in symbolic form, before realising that (b) this, that, or the other version 
of the object is not the object itself, leading to further efforts to obtain the lost object 
leading back to a situation where (a) the subject believes they have finally found the 
lost object which similarly turns out to be (b) a symbolic representation of the thing, 
rather than the thing itself and so on ad infinitum. This is the cybernetic feedback 
loop of Freudian drive [20] operative within the Lacanian unconscious [25].
But beyond reflecting the circularity of Freudian drive, Lacan’s vision of the 
cybernetic nature of the unconscious also show how the infinite complexity of 
human language reduces towards a very simple binary code—satisfaction/dissat-
isfaction, being/not being, or plus/minus—leading him to suggest that the subject 
is a cybernetic machine endlessly switching between states of having/not having 
or not having/having, since the self is born in a state of deficit/lack/default (trau-
matic separation). Following this discussion, Lacan famously explains his cyber-
netic take on psychoanalysis through Edgar Allan Poe’s [29] short story, The Pur-
loined Letter, where the lost object becomes the letter circulating between the 
Queen who loses the letter in the first place, Minister D who steals the letter and 
then proceeds to hide it in plain sight, and finally Dupin, who finally retrieves the 
letter and (we must assume) returns it to the Queen in order to complete the circle 
and ensure that the letter finds its way home. The key point of Lacan’s reading 
is that regardless of the movements of the letter, and who is in/out of possession 
of this prized (lost) object, it ends up finding its way back to its original owner. 
Despite the contingency involved in the play of dispossession/possession, which 
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Lacan relates to the game of ‘odds and evens’, the unconscious rules of the game 
mean that things always end the same way. In ‘odds and evens’ the cast iron law 
of probability ensures that an infinite number of plays will always lead straight 
back to the start. Everything cycles back to the beginning in the end.
Given this conclusion, Poe’s [30] obsession with the end, and the funereal sub-
ject of Freud’s essay [20], it is surprising that Lacan never completely reveals or 
spells out the Freudian thanatology behind The Purloined Letter, which is that 
regardless of the route we take through life, we can never escape the ‘ghastly 
grim and ancient raven’ that cries out ‘nevermore’ [31]. In fact, Lacan tends to 
confirm this reading himself later in the seminar when he explains that what 
really lay behind the symbol, and the idea of the lost object, is lack and the basic 
anxiety that we feel before the endlessness of death. At this point Lacan [25] tells 
us that this is what the symbol ultimately hides: the Heideggerian lack inherent 
in being itself. However, Lacan fails to mention that this is precisely the insight 
that possessed Poe, even though he returns to his work later in his discussion 
when he mentions The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar [32]—where the pro-
tagonist Valdemar meets his maker under hypnosis, but somehow retains the abil-
ity to live on to confirm his own death (‘I am dead’)—in order to restate the point 
that the symbol (the word) represents the minimal difference between life and 
death. What this means is that there is nothing, there is no error, there is only 
endless darkness, until the symbol emerges and invents the universe. This was, 
of course, Leibniz’s insight in the late seventeenth century when he wrote ‘omni-
bus ex nihilo ducendis sifficit uncum’ (to draw everything from nothing, one is 
enough) and essentially separated being from nothingness in binary code, where 
0 is nothingness, and 1 is the creation of being [33]. Despite the creation of being, 
however, what Lacan’s [25] reference to Poe illustrates is that in the end there is 
no escape from the end. Regardless of its complexity, the symbol is ultimately a 
tombstone. Although the symbol may well represent the tomb, I think the issue 
of the extent of complexity is a very important one that needs unpacking because 
it has a bearing on the way Lacan understand the human relation to the machine. 
Towards the end of the seminar Lacan notes that the first symbol emerges from 
the body, meaning that it clearly refers back to corporeality and embodied experi-
ence, before increasing abstraction leads to the severing of the symbol-body con-
nection. In the end the symbol has no body. At this point it is completely out on 
its own and the body is mute. It is interesting that Lacan passes over this point 
without elaborating on the difference this makes to humanity, which becomes 
ever more estranged from its symbolic inventions, because the most important 
impact of the increasing abstraction and simplification of communication is that 
it strips back what may very well be the necessary humanistic illusion that we are 
more than fleshy machines endlessly switching between being and not being and 
plunges cybernetic man straight into drive where elaborate civilizational codes 
start to break down before the mechanics of repetition and automation. This is, 
importantly, Stiegler’s [7] key point that I want to consider below. In his view we 
are not simply fleshy machines, but rather creatures that co-produce with technol-
ogy. From this point of view, then, the key problem of the Lacanian idea of the 
subject is that it is too simplistic in respect that this figure is endlessly caught in 
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a mechanical borderline state where it is either ‘on’ or ‘off’—similar to Claude 
Shannon famous suicide machine which has no other purpose than to relentlessly 
oppose its user by turning itself off [9]—and it cannot escape from the vicious 
circle of the eternal (robotic) return.
The problem of the Lacanian [24] vision of the self is, therefore, that from 
a humanistic perspective it is entirely robotised and erases the possibility that 
we might change our minds and break out of the nightmare of endless repetition. 
Despite this conclusion, however, there is a sense in which this conceptualisation of 
the self reflects the state of the individual in the early twenty-first century, particu-
larly where a writer like Zuboff [6] who reflects on the computational violence of 
the hyperconnected society is concerned. Keeping in mind Shannon’s central place 
in the pre-history of the contemporary high-tech society, we might, therefore, sup-
port the conclusion of Martin Burckhardt and Dirk Hofer [33] who make the link 
between life in the new cybernetic society and BPD (borderline personality disor-
der), where one is constantly switching between being either completely null and 
void or hyperconnected to everybody and everything, and suggest that living on the 
borderline has become more or less normal in the dystopian online world caught 
between the Boolean alternatives of ‘all and nothing’. Similarly in the experience 
of bipolar disorder the mixed states of depressive-mania and manic-depression cir-
culate endlessly meaning that the bipolar individual is never able to settle, focus, or 
think about life in terms of a narrative moving from the past through the present into 
the future. In other words, the bipolar person lives in a kind of vortex, a swirling 
permanent present torn between skyscraping highs and bottomless lows, and they 
cannot make sense of the world through long term projective thinking. Considering 
Poe’s own familiarity with the maelstrom of manic-depression [34, 35], it is, there-
fore, probably not very surprising that Lacan [25] finds himself referring to Poe to 
illustrate the psychology of his cybernetic self endlessly switching between states of 
being and not being, but what is perhaps more surprising is that he should end up 
normalising this vision of the self, particularly since Freud [20] clearly considered 
drive a pathological state and was deeply concerned about its destructive potential. 
What, then, led Lacan [25] to conclude that drive was normal? What led him to 
reduce Freud’s original psychoanalytic social control system to a post-human cyber-
netic switching machine? On the basis of reading Lydia Liu’s [9] book on the emer-
gence of the Freudian robot we can support the claim that what led Lacan to break 
with Freud over the normality of drive was the influence of the original cybernetic 
theorists, and in particular Wiener and Shannon, who popularised the idea that the 
human mind could be thought about in terms of an elaborate computer program and 
saw no problem with the emergence of what we might call Boolean man. Although 
the pathological consequences of reading Freud through Wiener and Shannon to 
reach the conclusion that drive was somehow normal should have emerged from 
his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle [20], it is strange that Lacan barely 
mentions Thanatos or the ‘death’ drive in the seminar, even managing to more or 
less evade the subject of death in his reading of Poe, who was obsessed by the end! 




The reason Lacan’s [25] conceptualisation of ‘drive without death’ is significant 
is because, I think, it opens up the possibility of thinking about a broad cultural 
shift over the course of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century towards a vision 
of ‘the dehumanisation of death’ in understandings of cybernetic humanity. This 
is what, I want to suggest, Stiegler [7] reveals in his work. In effect, then, I want 
to suggest that it may be possible to read Lacan’s normalisation of Freudian drive 
as symptomatic of a wider cultural move towards the normalisation of cybernetic 
violence in western culture that involves the reduction of the human to the level of 
a reactive servo-mechanism that collapses towards entropy, but never really thinks 
about its own definitive end. Although there was also a cyber-utopian thread run-
ning through the history of the twentieth century, which Fred Turner [36] uncov-
ers in his work on the connection between the counterculture and cyberculture, my 
claim is that Lacan’s break with Freud in the name of marrying psychoanalysis with 
the computational thinking of Wiener and Shannon might be seen to represent a 
key moment in the history of thinking about human psychology in a high-tech soci-
ety that explains the normalisation of the kind of mathematical violence Zuboff [6] 
writes about in her monumental work on surveillance capitalism.
Under these conditions, the law is no longer the Freudian law of Civilization and 
its Discontents [26] (the normalisation project) or the Deleuzo-Guattarian law of the 
schizophrenic of Anti-Oedipus [3] (the individualisation project), but rather the pre-/
post-human law of Lacanian cybernetics that ends up (hyper-)normalising pathology 
(the cybernetic project). Regarding the emergence of this new law of wires, circuits, 
switches and electric flows, it is worth pointing out that there are several moments in 
Zuboff’s [6] book when she considers the problem of the normalisation of the com-
modification of human experience. She wonders—how is it that have we fallen into 
a cybernetic dystopia and come to think that this way of living is somehow normal? 
I want to suggest some kind of an answer to this question through my reading of 
Lacan’s [25] reading of Freud [20]. That is to say that the basic point of my reading 
of Lacan’s seminar on Beyond the Pleasure Principle is to suggest that it is possible 
to locate a key moment in the normalisation of the contemporary cybernetic self, in 
psychoanalytic thought at least, in Lacan’s normalisation of Freudian drive which 
we might then connect to the problem of hyper-normalisation (or the normalisation 
of madness) Stiegler [7] critiques in his work. Let me now take up Stiegler’s critique 
of high-tech society and his ‘survival project’, where he sets out his response to the 
new cybernetic dystopia that threatens to robotise humanity (and everything else 
organic) out of existence.
3  Stiegler’s Apocalyptic ‘Survival Project’
In volume I of Technics and Time [37] Stiegler sets out his own cybernetic theory 
of humanity through reference to Plato’s retelling of the myth of Epimetheus in his 
Protagoras [38]. Against Marx who makes everything about Prometheus, Stiegler 
focuses on the role played by the other brother. Plato’s story goes:
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Once upon a time there were just the gods; mortal beings did not yet exist. 
And when the appointed time came for them to come into being too, the gods 
moulded them within the earth, mixing together earth and fire and their com-
pounds. And when they were about to bring them out into the light of day, they 
appointed Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip each kind with the powers 
it required. Epimetheus asked Prometheus to let him assign the powers him-
self. “Once I have assigned them,” he said, “you can inspect them”; so Pro-
metheus agreed, and Epimetheus assigned the powers. To some creatures he 
gave strength, but not speed, while he equipped the weaker with speed. He 
gave some claws or horns, and for those without them he devised some other 
power for their preservation… Now Epimetheus, not being altogether wise, 
didn’t notice that he had used up all powers on the non-rational creatures; so 
last of all he was left with human kind, quite unprovided for, and he was at a 
loss what to do. As he was racking his brains Prometheus came to inspect the 
distribution, and saw the other creatures well provided for in every way, while 
man was naked and unshod, without any covering for his bed or any fangs or 
claws; and already the appointed day was at hand, on which man too had to 
come out of the earth to the light of day. Prometheus was at his wit’s end to 
find a means of preservation for mankind, so he stole from Hephaestus and 
Athena their technical skills along with the use of fire…and that was what he 
gave to man…And as a result man was well provided with resources for his 
life, but afterwards, so it is said, thanks to Epimetheus, Prometheus paid the 
penalty for theft [38, pp. 17–18].
According to Stiegler’s reading of Plato’s myth, humanity was always/already 
cybernetic and would never have survived without the machines Prometheus enabled 
them to create. In this theory humanity is born in default and cannot compete with 
animals with claws and teeth because of Epimetheus’ mistake which left human-
ity poorly equipped for life in the state of nature. However, Prometheus saves his 
brother’s bacon by stealing from the Gods in order to give humans a fighting chance. 
Thus commences the history of human civilization where problem-solving relies on 
natural ingenuity and the ability to make machines. Centrally Stiegler’s [37] the-
sis is that we have never reached the point where we have no more need for inven-
tion—the point of equilibrium, where no more development is necessary—because 
nature continues to thwart the possibility of technological utopia meaning that the 
need for innovation never ends. Humanity is, thus, endlessly in default. We make 
machines, that make problems, that require technological fixes and so on endlessly 
into the future. Although this was a sustainable situation for much of human history, 
Stiegler explains that modernity might be understood in terms of a kind of tipping 
point where technology stops becoming about the salvation of the human and starts 
to destroy its master. When this happens the logic of deferral fails and humanity is 
thrown into a permanent state of default (without switching), which Stiegler [39] 
looks to capture through the concept of ‘disorientation’, meaning that the human 
no longer feels at home, comfortable, or able to make sense of the technological 
world that seems to have left them behind. At this point Stiegler [37, 39] takes up 
Heidegger’s [40] famous critique of technology, enframing, and the forgetting of 
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being to explain the estrangement of humanity from its own technology, but I think 
the shift he explains might equally describe the move that takes place in Lacan’s 
re-reading of Freudian drive in respect of the way that pre-/post-human mechanisa-
tion suddenly becomes normal leaving humanity stranded in a universe of wires, 
switches, circuits and electric currents. Referring back to Heidegger’s [40] distinc-
tion between ancient techne and modern technology, Stiegler [39] explains that 
modern technology suspends the history of necessary co-production, which saw 
humanity and machine become together in sympathy with the earth in order to sur-
vive, in favour of a new state of estrangement where machines develop and humans 
lose all sense of where these technological things came from or how they function. 
Under these conditions, the machine encourages men to start to look upon people 
and animals like so many things to be used and abused in the name of further devel-
opment. We are now on road to the extinction of organic life.
In developing his thesis Stiegler [37, 39] refers to (a) Heidegger’s [40] critique of 
the replacement of the carpenter who uses tools to work with the grain of the wood 
by technology and the machine man who smashes nature into shape and (b) Marx’s 
[41] theory of the deskilling of craftspeople throughout the history of industrial cap-
italism to describe the experience of what he calls proletarianisation. In Stiegler’s 
[39] work the experience of proletarianisation, or what we might call ‘becoming 
stupid’, occurs in inverse proportion to the development of technology, leading to 
the conclusion that the emergence of cybernetic civilization involves profound psy-
chological regression on the part of humanity. Mirroring Heidegger’s [42] critique 
of Nietzsche, where the utopianism of the ubermensch folds into the nihilism of the 
technological will to will and nothing more, or indeed Marx’s [43] theory of indus-
trial capitalism, which shows how the worker degenerates to the level of a beast at 
the same time that the machine becomes ever more complex, Stiegler’s [38, 39] his-
tory of modern technology paints a nightmarish picture of the dehumanisation and 
objectification of men and women who seem to have no place in the new world. In 
much the same way that Lacan [25] reroutes the Freudian idea of the unconscious 
through Wiener and Shannon in order to show how humanity is part of an enormous 
computational system, Stiegler [7, 37, 39] imagines the human lost in a high tech 
civilization no longer worthy of the name, with the important difference that Stiegler 
thinks we need to find some way to escape from this situation. Akin to Heidegger, 
and before him Marx, Stiegler [37, 39] suggests that we can trace the origins of this 
problem back to modernity and perhaps the moment Nietzsche’s Zarathustra first 
ventured out of his cave. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra [44] Nietzsche imagines that 
his prophet’s insane vision of the end of the God would liberate the ubermensch to 
make their own law, but Heidegger’s [42] criticism of Nietzsche was that Godless-
ness had simply produced a technological universe set on blind becoming and little 
else. In this respect, modernity becomes about the will that wills to will and nothing 
more. There is nothing beyond what Schopenhauer and Nietzsche wrote about in 
terms of the will and Freud would later call drive. Although Nietzsche [45] thought 
about the endless will through the idea of the eternal return, and making the most of 
whatever comes one’s way, we know that both Freud [20] and later Heidegger [42] 
saw the terminal downside of Nietzsche’s vicious circle in the infernal mechanisa-
tion of the death drive/technological will.
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Extending this Freudian/Heideggerian critique, Stiegler sets out to trace the 
development of the drive-based society up to the present. In his works on Disbelief 
and Discredit [46–48] he draws upon Max Weber’s [49] Nietzschean theory of the 
spirit of capitalism which, we might recall, explains how the American Calvinists 
kick-started capitalism in the name of the glory of God. However, we also remem-
ber that Weber shows that this was a fatal strategy, at least as far as the longevity of 
God was concerned. According to Weber, God was over the moment this happened. 
What this means is that the value rationality required to make money in order to ease 
the salvation anxiety about whether one was saved or damned in God’s great plan 
eventually started to undermine belief in God Himself resulting in the emergence of 
a form of capitalism based upon instrumental rationality. In other words, the capital-
ists had no more need for God. In this new system the point of making money was 
simply to make even more money and we can start to see the outline of the drive-
based economy. In the first instance, the Protestant work ethic stood in for God, but 
Stiegler [48] explains that eventually this relic of the religious system was replaced 
by consumerism, where one works in order to make money in order to consume in 
order to live in the late capitalist utopia of the fully-satisfied consumer, star, or in 
contemporary society, the celebrity who is exactly like the rest of us, but somehow 
better. Thus, Stiegler [48] updates his history of the estrangement of humanity from 
modern technology by moving through Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Weber until 
finally he reaches Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the culture industry, which 
becomes about the way that the meaningful structures of culture that would have 
once held people in webs of significance collapse towards a mechanical production 
line of meaningless things and the desire for a better future short-circuits towards 
drive where we want everything now.
In the mid-twentieth century Adorno and Horkheimer [5] were able to show how 
the culture industry functioned like a kind of capitalist religion, with the consumer 
in cast in the role of a modern day Tantalus endlessly looking for the commodity 
that they believe would make them complete, but the problem with this system is 
that it eventually suffered under pressure of the massive expansion of the economy. 
At this point Stiegler [50] shows how late capitalism, which is late because it is 
fatally set on its own self-destruction, starts to consume itself by (a) speeding up 
innovation, development, and production in the name of increasing profits, (b) relax-
ing its moral parameters so that more or less anything the consumer wants is for 
sale, and (c) making the commodity available to pretty much anybody with access 
to easy credit. Under these conditions, Freud’s Oedipal law, where one is prohibited 
from ever reaching what one really wants, starts to break down before the increas-
ing speed of the cycle of production, consumption, production, until the consumer 
enters the space of drive, where the endless line of commodities no longer convince 
or capture the imagination and they start to see what they really want. Here, Stiegler 
[50] shows that the more readily available and the more disposable the commodity 
becomes, the weaker its ability to command its legions of believers, until eventually 
nobody really believes any longer. In this sense what Stiegler calls ‘disinhibition’, 
or the collapse of Oedipal law, sounds the death knell for the theological, consumer 
utopia and the rise of a kind of post-social or asocial society premised on hyper-con-
sumption, disposability, disbelief, cynicism, and a complete disregard for rules and 
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regulation. In recent works, including States of Shock [50], The Automatic Society 
[51], and most recently The Age of Disruption [7], Stiegler explains that it is pre-
cisely this situation that Adorno and Horkheimer [5] saw coming when they wrote 
about the dialectic of the enlightenment and the cunning reversal of reason towards 
barbarism through the circuits of instrumental rationality. Now it is under these cir-
cumstances that Stiegler [7, 50, 51] thinks that the human, who evolved through tool 
use and the creation of machines, starts to regress towards a new pre-/post-human 
state of instinctual/automatic behaviour. However, this new state of second nature 
no longer resembles the kind of Hobbesian savagery Freud might have imagined, 
because in the new (un)world instinct is entirely mediated by cybernetic systems 
that exert control over the pre-/post-human lost in a state of disorientation on the 
level of behaviour. This is, of course, precisely the kind of system it is possible to 
identify in Lacan’s [27] re-reading of the Freudian [20] concept of drive which shifts 
from being a model for understanding the potential degeneration of humanity in 
Freud’s study of the other side of the pleasure principle to a prophecy about human-
ity’s technological future in Lacan’s seminar.
Apart from normalising drive, we remember that Lacan’s [25] other major move 
in his seminar on Beyond the Pleasure Principle was to reduce complex language to 
the level of binary code, with the result that he ended up encrypting death itself in a 
kind of endless switching machine where the subject is either (a) in full possession 
of the symbolic representation of the lost object that they take for the thing itself 
or (b) in a state of despair following the realisation that what they thought was the 
thing itself is nothing more than a symbolic representation of it leading to (c) the 
renewal of the search for the thing itself which invariably leads back to (a) and so on 
ad nauseam. In Stiegler’s [7] work this reduction of the subject to the level of binary 
code (Boolean man) is reflective of the late capitalist obsession with number and 
economic understandings of the world through the lens of more or less calculations 
that eventually result in the emergence of a new computational legal system Rouv-
roy and Berns [52] write about in terms of algorithmic governmentality. The essen-
tial problem of this situation for Stiegler [7] is that it transforms the human into a 
machine capable of little more than repetition, counting, and basic logic and reduces 
the thickness of civilized understanding of and engagement with the world to tech-
nological hyper-control through data collection and behaviour management. Under 
the regime of computational hyper-control, there is no deep understanding or moral 
sense of the need to follow rules. Indeed, Stiegler [7] says that this becomes impos-
sible in the universe of number because endless counting sees memory break down 
and the basic structure of temporality that enables humans to make sense of their 
world collapse. In other words, the now robotised subject has no sense of the past 
to inform their understandings of the present to help them imagine possible futures 
in advance of their existing situation and instead finds themselves in a situation 
where there is nothing beyond programmatic repetition and reaction to behavioural 
switches. We are now in the realm of late capitalist cybernetic law where number is 
everything and culture means nothing.
As Stiegler [7] explains through reference to Winnicott, culture should enable the 
subject to transition between existing and future states, but this form of development 
that enables children to become adults has now been boiled down to blind becoming 
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where the differences between ‘then’, ‘now’, and ‘what is to come’ is expressed 
numerically or through ideas of cost, benefit, advantage, and profit. Throughout his 
work Stiegler [50, 51, 53, 54] writes about this situation through the concepts of 
systemic stupidity, symbolic misery, or, in his recent The Age of Disruption [7], ‘the 
epoch of the absence of epoch’, which suggests that the current historical period 
is a period paradoxically devoid of all sense of periodisation, history, purpose, or 
common horizon. Although Hegel, Kojeve, and Fukuyama each imagined the end 
of history in more or less utopian terms, Stiegler’s [7] end is entirely dystopian in 
its paradoxical endlessness, which reveals the nightmarish consequences of Lacan’s 
[25] ‘dehumanisation of death’, at least insofar as this condition is reflected in the 
new computational utopia/dystopia. At this point in The Age of Disruption [7] Stie-
gler returns to Heidegger [15] and the concept of ‘being towards death’ to explain 
the impact of the dehumanisation of death and the related emergence of the idea 
of the endless cybernetic feedback loop upon human life, motivation, and possible 
futures. He concludes that the effect of the transformation of the end into the end-
less feedback loop is the profound collapse of the temporal symbolic structures that 
enabled the construction of self, other, and collective in what he calls the murderous 
disarticulation of ‘I’ and ‘We’. Caught in this state of collective disindividualisation 
that results in the subject falling into a kind of schizophrenic crisis, where it starts 
to doubt its own existence, the only way out appears to be through the kind of fatal 
circuit Lacan [25] outlined in his re-reading of Freud, which is precisely what find 
when we explore the way Homo Digitalis looks to endlessly insist upon their own 
existence through the repetitious posting of selfies on Instagram and other online 
platforms where the only objective is to say to the world ‘Look at me, I exist’.
Regarding this phenomenon, Byung-Chul Han [55] explains that Homo Digitalis 
is not simply nobody, but instead should be thought about as somebody with a pro-
file desperately vying for attention in order to confirm their existence. Unfortunately, 
this desperate need to stand out, to be recognised as somebody, is fatally undercut by 
the state of isolation that marks life inside what Han calls ‘the swarm’. In a similar 
vein Stiegler [7] writes about subjectivity in a state of Cartesian anxiety about exist-
ence reflected in a desperate need for some sense of recognition in a society that 
reduces everybody to the fate of the number. Reflecting upon the way this condition 
impacts upon young people in the process of developing their sense of self hardest, 
Stiegler writes [47] about the phenomenon of negative sublimation where the ruined 
individual looks to leave their mark on the world through violent, destructive acts. In 
his view the deep sense of nihilism that leads to the violence of negative sublimation 
is what really confirms that we have put an end to the future. Quoting fifteen-year-
old Florian—who says ‘You really take no account of what happens to us. When 
I talk to young people of my generation, who are about two or three years older 
or younger than me, they all say the same: we no longer have the dream to found 
a family, to have children, or a profession, or ideals, like you did when you were 
teenagers. That’s all over, because we are sure that we will be the last generation, or 
one of the last, before the end’ [7, p. 9]—Stiegler concludes that we must find some 
way to escape the endlessness of drive and rediscover hope in the future. Although 
neither Han or Stiegler refer to Lacan’s [25] reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle [20] or the stories of Edgar Allan Poe in their work, there is something 
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deeply troubling about the desperation of selfie culture, the phenomenon of negative 
sublimation, and the need to insist on the existence of the ‘I’ in the face of a situa-
tion that seems to run counter to any form of recognition, which recalls the horror of 
Poe’s [32] Valdemar where the main character’s confirmation of a minimal level of 
existence resides in knowing that he is already dead. Is this the best Homo Digitalis 
can hope for in a the new (un)world that has been more or less completely colonised 
by number and what Zuboff [6] calls surveillance capitalism? This is exactly what 
Stiegler [7] suggests. Indeed, his suggestion is that we must face up to the horror of 
this situation and understand that the space of the individual, the inter-individual, or 
the trans-individual that would have once taken the form of durable culture informed 
by memories of the past and visions of the future, has now been completely colo-
nised by the data economy. In his view ratio is the new logos meaning that we can 
forget about the Freudian idea of the moral law. There is nothing left but number and 
endless counting.
In this respect perhaps Lacan [25] was right about the rise of the cybernetic/com-
putational law, but wrong about the normality of this situation, unless we take the 
next step of connecting normality with madness, which is, essentially, what Stiegler 
does across a number of books, but particularly The Age of Disruption [7], where 
insanity is the result of the globalisation of the Californian business model commit-
ted to high tech innovation, shock, disruption, and the destruction of all forms of 
consistency. According to Stiegler [7], the most serious of these destructive acts is 
the one that transforms culture into a computational rats maze, or behavioural utopia 
where thinking is replaced by reflex and reaction, because this starts to undermine 
humanity’s ability to understand reality and recognise its key difference from the 
machine, which resides in its inability to overcome the barrier of death. While this 
looks very much like a disadvantage from the side of the machine, it is, of course, 
very precisely this evolutionary advantage what enables humans to think and make 
sense, which is why the separation of Lacan from Freud over the issue of the death 
drive has such important implications for the politics of psychoanalysis, in the sense 
that by taking the side of the machine and dehumanising death Lacan essentially 
condemns humanity to a state of pre-/post-humanity where instinct, automation, or 
what Heidegger [15] called busyness (besorgen) rule, leaving no space for the mobil-
ity of thought that enables the human to change their mind. This ability to think dif-
ferently is particularly important today because, as Stiegler [7] shows, it may be that 
the post-human technological system has reached its limits in the discovery of the 
anthropocene, which is generally thought to refer the idea of a completely human-
ised world, but in actual fact should be understood in terms of the emergence of a 
pre-/post-human planet, since we now know that the complete humanisation of the 
earth is in the process of rendering the world unliveable for humans who, we must 
not forget, rely on the biosphere for their survival.
Responding to this situation Stiegler [7] notes that there is nowhere else we 
can escape to from here, no more development, no more technological fixes, but 
the neganthropocentric realisation that we are not machines that can somehow 
live without bodies and a world that keeps us alive. In essence Stiegler’s ‘survival 
project’ revolves around this insight, this change of mind, this thinking through 
of technological estrangement, which he hopes has the potential to transform the 
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techno-post-human anthropocene into an organic-pre-human neganthropocene ani-
mated by a culture that rejects the hubris of the Prometheans who think that we are 
somehow divine beings able to live without bodies that wither, decay, and die in 
favour of the spirit of Epimetheus that recognises our essential fallibility, vulnerabil-
ity, and limitations, which are fundamentally linked to the law of all organic crea-
tures. This law says that despite everything, we eventually die. Although this change 
of mind seems impossible, and the reader will probably doubt that we will ever give 
up on our machines that are progressively destroying the planet and everybody and 
everything that relies on it for survival, Stiegler [7] thinks that we will eventually be 
forced to comes to terms with our limitations, and our own mortality, in the ines-
capable recognition of the signs of the end times that have been piling up since the 
early 1970s: the realisation of the limits to economic growth, the end of history, 
the end of the end of history, 9/11, the financial crash, ever increasing inequality, 
impending ecological disaster, and now the coronavirus. In this respect, Stiegler sees 
the potential for the emergence of the incalculable from calculation, finds hope in 
the hopeless, and the possibility of utopian escape from the nightmarish dystopia of 
computation that appears endless in its ability to keep counting.
Writing about his own depression in The Age of Disruption [7], Stiegler finds 
a model for a pharmacological response to these signs of the apocalypse (a word 
which we might recall comes from the Greek ‘apocalypsis’ meaning uncovering 
or revealing), which would see the original life support system of technology that 
has now completed its transformation into a kind of global death drive, turn back 
towards a more sustainable and liveable cultural form. In thinking about the pos-
sibility of this new more/less human social order, Stiegler explains that we might 
find reasons for living that are unthinkable in the contemporary nihilistic system, but 
returns to the key point over and over again that this potential relies on recognising 
the inescapable necessity of death and indeed, what we face today, the extinction of 
life on earth. Thus Stiegler’s survival project, which essentially involves the psycho-
analytic possibility of humanity changing its mind, of thinking up some other way 
of living, and escaping the closed loop of the cybernetic system that has turned the 
transformative potential of death into a kind of dreary endlessness, rests on con-
fronting the truth of the nightmare that one day there will be no more days. The 
reason this is so important is because Stiegler thinks that facing up to the night-
mare that we are sleep walking towards the end of humanity will open up the pos-
sibility of dreaming and imagining ways to realise the dream of escape from our 
current dystopian situation, similar to the way in which Bataille’s [56] first humans 
raised themselves above the level of the beasts by painting pictures on the walls of 
the caves at Lascaux.
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